



2 December 1983




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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John A. Bross

SUBJECT:  Paper on Deception

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1.  report strikes me as a perceptive survey of deception activities. I agree with his conclusions about   qualifications for a role in these activities.


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2. The whole subject has infinite potentialities for wheel spinning. There is probably no way to subject tactical deception plans and initiatives of the military services to anything like centralized coordination and control. It may be possible to arrive at some workable definition of what is tactical. The criterion might be negative -- anything which could have serious adverse political consequences should be regarded as strategic and subject to centralized policy review -- presumably at the NSC level.

3. I agree with what I understand to be John McMahon's view that positive deception carried out by the U.S. is an entirely separate function from counterintelligence, and positive deception programs should be formulated as a separate responsibility on the basis of a very careful and high-level appraisal of their potential risks and advantages. Once approved, a deception operation will in all probability employ at least some resources of a counterintelligence nature.


4. The important thing seems to me to be to place the responsibility for establishing the Intelligence Community's contribution to an appraisal of the risks and advantages of a given deception project at an appropriate location and level. Positive intelligence will obviously be a critical factor in any such appraisal. The person responsible for the appraisal should therefore have access to relevant intelligence sources and estimates.  points out, this will not be a full-time job. I see no reason why it could not be performed under the supervision of an NIO for Counterintelligence Threat Analysis, if such a position is created.

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5. Operational supervision of any projects approved is a different matter and might have to be determined ad hoc with DoD perhaps playing a major and possibly a primary role.



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6.  quite correct in pointing out that the line between deception and covert action is very narrow. Doubts should be resolved in favor of treating a proposal as covert action (unless security is regarded as an overriding factor).

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7. So far I have not seen any scenarios which make much sense outside of the technology transfer area where positive results seem possible.

8. I hope that it will be possible to retain David Packard's interest as he, I think, can make a very useful contribution for a number of reasons.



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John A. Bross